Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):135 – 149 (2001)
Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia.
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DOI 10.1080/10002001058538712
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References found in this work BETA
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 2007 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Robert Audi - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Integrity, Commitment and the Concept of a Person.Nancy Schauber - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):119-129.

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Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?Greg Scherkoske - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.

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