History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275 (2008)

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Abstract
Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.
Keywords Kant  Cassirer  truth  object  correspondence
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When is Circularity in Definitions Benign?J. A. Burgess - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
The Trouble with Truth in Kant's Theory of Meaning.Robert Hanna - 1993 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1):1-20.

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