An Essay on Free Will

Oxford University Press (1983)
Authors
Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
"This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
Keywords Compatibilism  Determinism  Ethics  Fatalism  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1986
Buy the book $10.36 used (75% off)   $32.76 new (20% off)   $38.82 direct from Amazon (6% off)    Amazon page
Call number BJ1461.V36 1983
ISBN(s) 0198249241   9780198249245  
DOI 10.2307/2185448
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,865
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.

View all 117 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
1,817 ( #534 of 2,293,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
198 ( #1,340 of 2,293,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature