A measurable and testable brain-based emergent interactionism

Journal of Mind and Behavior 201 (2):201-219 (1991)

Abstract

Possible measurement and testability weaknesses in Sperry's mind-supervenient emergent interactionism "argument by analogy" model are described. An alternative brain-supervenient interactionism that addresses the weaknesses of Sperry's mind-brain model is presented. The alternative model, Neurological Positivism - a systems-theoretical evolutionary epistemology - proposes that the measurable energy quality of the algorithmic organization of the Darwinian brain supervenes that of cultural mental models and thus downwardly influences the brain circuitry patterns that underlie them. Brain and mind are defined in interrelated energy terms within the context of the self-referential maximum-power principle. The equivalence of maximum-power principle energy hierarchies to chaotic/fractal dynamical designs is described. The production of mental models through reflective thinking is defined as an emergent dimension of energetic self-referencing by the brain operating in accordance with the maximum-power principle. It is concluded that within the context of NP the brain-mind relationship constitutes an "uneven" central state energy identity, with brain supervenient, when brain-mind relative energy qualities are taken into account

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