Synthese 197 (10):4617-4636 (2020)

Daniel Vanello
University of Warwick
The aim of this paper is to defend, and in so doing clarify, the claim that the affective component of emotional experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. In particular, it argues that the phenomenally conscious affective component of emotional experience provides the subject with the epistemic access to the semantic value of evaluative concepts. The core argument relies on a comparison with the role played by the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in the acquisition of knowledge of colours. The upshot is that it is a disanalogy with perceptual experience that explains the essential role of affective experience in acquiring evaluative knowledge, namely its motivational component.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02120-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Home University Library.

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