Theory and Decision 44 (2):117-148 (1998)

The Shapley value is the unique value defined on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form which satisfies certain intuitively reasonable axioms. Alternatively, the Banzhaf value is the unique value satisfying a different set of axioms. The main drawback of the latter value is that it does not satisfy the efficiency axiom, so that the sum of the values assigned to the players does not need to be equal to the worth of the grand coalition. By definition, the normalized Banzhaf value satisfies the efficiency axiom, but not the usual axiom of additivity
Keywords Cooperative game  Characteristic function form  Shapley value  Banzhaf value  Additivity axiom  Simple game
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004972127482
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