Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37 (1995)

Bas C. Van Fraassen
San Francisco State University
This is surely a bit of Socrates' famous irony. He draws the analogy to explain how his friends should regard poetry as they regretfully banish it from the ideal state. But lovers were no more sensible then than they are now. The advice to banish poetry, undermined already by Plato's own delight and skill in drama, is perhaps undermined still further by this evocation of a 'sensible' lover who counts love so well lost. Yet Socrates' image is one of avowed rationality and prudence. The sensible lover imitates the older literary example of Ulysses' tying himself to the mast. (The example belongs therefore to the class of problems treated in Elster (1979)). Both this lover and Ulysses foresee that under certain possible future conditions, their opinions, values and preferences will or would differ from what they are now, in a very definite fashion. To what extent is such foresight possible? Correspondingly (when we do not claim foreknowledge) to what extent is such opinion reasonable, rational, coherent, or consistent in some suitably broad sense? It is not easy to understand exactly what is possible or even logically permissible in this respect. In an earlier paper, "Belief and the Will", I argued for a principle ("Reflection") to govern such deliberation. Here I will both generalize the treatment of opinion in "Belief and the Will" and respond to criticism. Critical examples mainly resembled the story of Ulysses who foresaw a period of dysfunction (at the sound 2 of the sirens) in his epistemic and/or doxastic future. Other criticism focused on the model of opinion used (precise numerical subjective probability) and on the merits of Dutch Book arguments. The present argument will not rely on Dutch Book arguments and strategies, and the Reflection principle will be formulated so as to apply also to vague opinion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/bf00996309
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,307
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 182 (3):327-329.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 113 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.Jon Elster (ed.) - 1979 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
Reflection, Disagreement, and Context.Edward Hinchman - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):95.
Ii. Ulysses and the Sirens.F. H. Hahn - 1980 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):479 – 482.
Reviving Ulysses Contracts.Ryan Spellecy - 2003 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (4):373-392.


Added to PP index

Total views
221 ( #51,287 of 2,507,871 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #101,472 of 2,507,871 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes