Beyond Fakers and Fanatics: a Reply to Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-6 (2016)
Abstract
Maarten Boudry and Jerry Coyne have written a piece, forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology, called “Disbelief in Belief,” in which they criticize my recent paper “Religious credence is not factual belief” (2014, Cognition 133). Here I respond to their criticisms, the thrust of which is that we shouldn’t distinguish religious credence from factual belief, contrary to what I say. I respond that their picture of religious psychology undermines our ability to distinguish common religious people from fanatics. My response will appear in the same issue as their paper.
Keywords belief  imagination  religion  credence  pretense  faker  fanatic  terrorism  atheism  Islam
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2016.1141400
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