Topoi 18 (2):93-96 (1999)
Probabilism in epistemology does not have to be of the Bayesian variety. The probabilist represents a person''s opinion as a probability function; the Bayesian adds that rational change of opinion must take the form of conditionalizing on new evidence. I will argue that this is the correct procedure under certain special conditions. Those special conditions are important, and instantiated for example in scientific experimentation, but hardly universal. My argument will be related to the much maligned Reflection Principle (van Fraassen, 1984, 1995), and partly inspired by the work of Brian Skyrms (1987).
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Citations of this work BETA
Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
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