Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):147-164 (2005)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Contextualists explain certain intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions by means of the thesis that 'knowledge' behaves like an indexical. This explanation denies what Peter Unger has called invariantism, i.e., the idea that knowledge ascriptions have truth value independent of the context in which they are issued. This paper aims to provide an invariantist explanation of the contextualist's intuitions, the core of which is that 'knowledge' has many different senses.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1163/18756735-069001008 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 70,163
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.
A Linguistic Grounding for a Polysemy Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW]Elke Brendel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
Knowledge Isn’T Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
35 ( #325,296 of 2,507,009 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,155 of 2,507,009 )
2009-01-28
Total views
35 ( #325,296 of 2,507,009 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,155 of 2,507,009 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
