Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):147-164 (2005)

René Van Woudenberg
VU University Amsterdam
Contextualists explain certain intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions by means of the thesis that 'knowledge' behaves like an indexical. This explanation denies what Peter Unger has called invariantism, i.e., the idea that knowledge ascriptions have truth value independent of the context in which they are issued. This paper aims to provide an invariantist explanation of the contextualist's intuitions, the core of which is that 'knowledge' has many different senses.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-069001008
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What is Ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.
A Linguistic Grounding for a Polysemy Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.

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