Philosophy of Science 76 (5):689-700 (2009)
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.
|Keywords||Michael Friedman Dynamics of Reason Neo-Kantian philosophy of science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition: Comments on John McDowell's Mind and World.Michael Friedman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):427-467.
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