Dynamics of reason and the Kantian project

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):689-700 (2009)
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I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.


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Maarten Van Dyck
Ghent University

Citations of this work

Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility.Milena Ivanova - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23 - 37.
Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):361-382.
Constitutive elements through perspectival lenses.Mariano Sanjuán - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-18.
Friedman, Galileo, and Reciprocal Iteration.David Marshall Miller - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1293-1305.

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