Philosophy of Science 76 (5):689-700 (2009)
AbstractI show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.
Similar books and articles
Constructing Practical Reason: O’Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism.Thomas M. Besch - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):55-76.
Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman : Kantian or Hegelian Dynamics of Reason?Alan Richardson - 2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
Narrating the History of Reason Itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a Constitutive a Priori for the Twenty-First Century.Alan W. Richardson - 2002 - Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.
Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University.Michael Friedman - 2001 - CSLI Publications.
Why Must We Treat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument.Michael Ridge - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):57-73.
So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean.Nikolas Kompridis - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):271 – 295.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):225-254.
Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility.Milena Ivanova - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23 - 37.
Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):361-382.
Constitutive elements through perspectival lenses.Mariano Sanjuán - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-18.
Friedman, Galileo, and Reciprocal Iteration.David Marshall Miller - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1293-1305.
References found in this work
Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason.Béatrice Longuenesse - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Kenneth R. Westphal & Beatrice Longuenesse - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):645.