Philosophy of Science 76 (5):689-700 (2009)

Authors
Maarten Van Dyck
University of Ghent
Abstract
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.
Keywords Michael Friedman  Dynamics of Reason  Neo-Kantian philosophy of science
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1086/605823
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):361-382.
Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility.Milena Ivanova - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23 - 37.
Constitutive elements through perspectival lenses.Mariano Sanjuán - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-18.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
332 ( #27,087 of 2,448,752 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #142,635 of 2,448,752 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes