Dynamics of reason and the Kantian project

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):689-700 (2009)
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm change as members of a convergent series introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm change on what I take to be Friedman’s own terms.
Keywords Michael Friedman  Dynamics of Reason  Neo-Kantian philosophy of science
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DOI 10.1086/605823
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