Deceiving without answering

Philosophical Studies:1-17 (forthcoming)
Authors
Peter Van Elswyk
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Abstract
Lying is standardly distinguished from misleading according to how a disbelieved proposition is conveyed. To lie, a speaker uses a sentence to say a proposition she does not believe. A speaker merely misleads by using a sentence to somehow convey but not say a disbelieved proposition. Front-and-center to the lying/misleading distinction is a conception of what-is-said by a sentence in a context. Stokke (2016, 2018) has recently argued that the standard account of lying/misleading is explanatorily inadequate unless paired with a theory where what-is-said by a sentence is determined by the question under discussion or QUD. I present two objections to his theory, and conclude that no extant theory of what-is-said enables the standard account of the lying/misleading distinction to be explanatorily adequate.
Keywords What is said  Lying  Lying and misleading  Question under discussion  QUD
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01239-7
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References found in this work BETA

Common Ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Insensitive Semantics.Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):443-450.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.

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