Foundations of Science 5 (4):429-456 (2000)

Abstract
An evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can be defined as a characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic already apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness can be regarded as the special experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. Awareness is what experience is to animals.Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness
Keywords Awareness  Consciousness  Evolution  Experience  Science
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DOI 10.1023/A:1011371811027
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The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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