Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent

Mind 127 (505):225-250 (2018)
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How is Frege able to claim that the notion of judgement is essential to his logic without introducing a form of psychologism? I argue first that Frege’s logical notion of judgement is to be distinguished from an empirical notion of judgement, that it cannot be understood as an abstract, idealized notion, and that there are doubts concerning a transcendental reading of Frege’s writings. Then, I explain that the logical notion of judgement has to be understood from a first-person perspective, to be contrasted with a third-person perspective, in which judgement is understood as an empirical, psychological phenomenon. Frege’s logic is essentially a first-person engagement, as each of us can make use of the ideography as a science of logic only if we ourselves have made the relevant judgements. Finally, I claim that the judging agent as conceived by Frege can, after all, be understood as a transcendental ego.



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Maria Van Der Schaar
Leiden University

Citations of this work

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Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth.Colin Johnston - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1124-1143.
The force and the content of judgment.Sebastian Rödl - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):506-517.

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References found in this work

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - New York,: Routledge.
Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1937 - New York,: Routledge.

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