Finite rational self-deceivers

Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208 (2008)
Abstract
I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational
Keywords Self-deception  Rationality  Paradox  Evolutionary psychology  Spandrel  Adaptation  Belief  Epistemic norm  Attention
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9112-1
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References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief.Christoph Michel & Albert Newen - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
The Product of Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.

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