The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to The Scientific Image, is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. The fourth and last is the loss of the possibility of objective evaluation of rationality in scientific methodology. It is argued that each of these problems is illusory
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.O. Bueno - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585-610.
Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):61-65.
Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism.F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.
Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image.J. Brakel - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
Similar books and articles
Viciousness and the Structure of Reality.Ricki Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism.Ali Hasan - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.
Does Schmidt's Process-Orientated Philosophy Contain a Vicious Infinite Regress Argument?S. Weber - 2011 - Constructivist Foundations 7 (1):34-35.
Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
The Vienna Circle's 'Anti-Foundationalism'.Thomas Oberdan - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):297-308.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads161 ( #28,951 of 2,171,693 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #56,794 of 2,171,693 )
How can I increase my downloads?