Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):500-520 (2017)

Authors
Raphael Van Riel
University of Duisburg-Essen
Abstract
Recently, a time-honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on. This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing to block incompatibilism.
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DOI 10.1111/sjp.12259
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References found in this work BETA

Branching Space-Time.Nuel Belnap - 1992 - Synthese 92 (3):385 - 434.
Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
Truth and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism.Ryan Wasserman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):66-77.

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