Hedged testimony

Noûs 57 (2):341-369 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-03-29

Downloads
852 (#32,416)

6 months
158 (#34,257)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter van Elswyk
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

The new evil demon problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):478-504.
Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so?Julia Staffel - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (3):1114-1136.
Testimony by LLMs.Jinhua He & Chen Yang - forthcoming - AI and Society.

Add more citations