Kant on Truth-Aptness

History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126 (2012)

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Abstract
Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.
Keywords truth  truth-aptness  truth-bearers  judgments
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DOI 10.1080/01445340.2011.606645
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
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