Kant on Truth-Aptness

History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126 (2012)
Abstract
Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.
Keywords truth  truth-aptness  truth-bearers  judgments
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/01445340.2011.606645
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Reason, Truth, and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 2004 - Yale University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-Aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?Catherine Wilson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114.
Relativism, Standards and Aesthetic Judgements.James O. Young - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):221 – 231.
Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth.Stephen J. Barker - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism.Michael Ridge - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
Is the Truth Table Task Mistaken?Aline Sevenants, Kristien Dieussaert & Walter Schaeken - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):119 - 132.
Added to PP index
2011-10-13

Total downloads
167 ( #28,201 of 2,180,175 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #9,724 of 2,180,175 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums