Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument

Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in the argument cannot be closed

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
543 (#18,482)

6 months
28 (#44,205)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Dietrich
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

The potential for consciousness of artificial systems.David Gamez - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):213-223.
On an argument for functional invariance.Michael Pelczar - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):373-377.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A computational foundation for the study of cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
The puzzle of conscious experience.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.

Add more references