Material Beings

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1990)
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Abstract

According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

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Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame

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