Most Peers Don’t Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):87-112 (2017)
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Abstract

Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises.

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Author Profiles

René Van Woudenberg
VU University Amsterdam
Hans Van Eyghen
VU University Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.

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References found in this work

What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Laws and symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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