European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):87-112 (2017)
AbstractRob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Similar books and articles
Rowe's Evidential Arguments From Evil.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 49-66.
Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion.Matthew Braddock - 2016 - Theology and Science 14 (3):268-287.
Hume, Causation and Two Arguments Concerning God.Jason Megill - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):169--177.
Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
Arguments for Atheism.Graham Oppy - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 53.
Can It Be Morally Permissible to Assert a Falsehood in Service of a Good Cause?Christopher Kaczor - 2012 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):97-109.
Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
Taking the Narrow Way: Lovering, Evil, and Knowing What God Would Do.Ryan Rhodes - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):25-35.
Scepticism and Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2018 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 581-591.
Critiques of Theistic Arguments.Ac Grayling - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 38.
Dealing With Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types of Epistemic Peers.Benjamin Elliott Wald - 2009 - Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):113-122.