Philosophia Scientae 19:143-158 (2015)

Authors
Ioannis Vandoulakis
Hellenic Open University
Abstract
The paper examines Andrei A. Markov’s critical attitude towards L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionism, as is expressed in his endnotes to the Russian translation of Heyting’s Intuitionism, published in Moscow in 1965. It is argued that Markov’s algorithmic approach was shaped under the impact of the mathematical style and values prevailing in the Petersburg mathematical school, which is characterized by the proclaimed primacy of applications and the search for rigor and effective solutions.
Keywords Foundations of Mathematics  Mathematical Logic  Intuitionism  Constructivism  Andrei A. Markov  Arend Heyting  Luitzen E. J. Brouwer
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DOI 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1054
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