Dissertation, University of Tasmania (2013)

Authors
Simon Van Rysewyk
University of Tasmania
Abstract
What is the relationship between pain and the body? I claim that pain is best explained as a type of personal experience and the bodily response during pain is best explained in terms of a type of mechanical neurophysiologic operation. I apply the radical philosophy of identity theory from philosophy of mind to the relationship between the personal experience of pain and specific neurophysiologic mechanism and argue that the relationship between them is best explained as one of type identity. Specifically, pain is a specific type of personal experience identical to a specific type of allostatic stress response comprised of interdependent nervous, endocrine and immune mechanical operations.
Keywords pain, type identity theory, dualism, allostasis, eliminative materialism, folk psychology, homeostasis, inverted qualia, mechanism, qualia
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Robot Pain.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.

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