Authors
Niels van Miltenburg
Utrecht University
Abstract
On Anscombe's view, intentional actions are characterized by a specific type of knowledge (practical knowledge) possessed by the agents that perform them. Recently, interest in Anscombean action theory has been renewed. Sarah Paul argues that Anscombean action theory faces a serious problem: It fails to discriminate between an action’s intended aim or purpose and its foreseen side effects. Since Anscombeans conceive practical knowledge as the formal cause of intentional actions, Paul dubs this a problem of “deviant formal causation.” In this paper I will show that Anscombean action theory can escape Paul’s critique by employing a sufficiently developed conception of practical knowledge. It will turn out that Anscombeans can precisely capture the difference between intended aim and foreseen side effect in terms of differences in the agent’s knowledge.
Keywords Anscombe, G.E.M.  intentional action  practical knowledge  intending/foreseeing distinction
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Reprint years 2012
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v6i1.147
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References found in this work BETA

Practical Reflection.Michael H. Robins - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.
Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Ethics 102 (1):117-128.

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Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.

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