Questions for the dynamicist: The use of dynamical systems theory in the philosophy of cognition [Book Review]
Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):271-333 (2005)
The concepts and powerful mathematical tools of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) yield illuminating methods of studying cognitive processes, and are even claimed by some to enable us to bridge the notorious explanatory gap separating mind and matter. This article includes an analysis of some of the conceptual and empirical progress Dynamical Systems Theory is claimed to accomodate. While sympathetic to the dynamicist program in principle, this article will attempt to formulate a series of problems the proponents of the approach in question will need to face if they wish to prolong their optimism. The main points to be addressed involve the reductive tendencies inherent in Dynamical Systems Theory, its somewhat muddled position relative to connectionism, the metaphorical nature DST-C exhibits which hinders its explanatory potential, and DST-C's problematic account of causality. Brief discussions of the mathematical and philosophical backgrounds of DST, seminal experimental work and possible adaptations of the theory or alternative suggestions (dynamicist connectionism, neurophenomenology, R&D theory) are included
|Keywords||Chaos Theory Cognition Dynamics Science Systems Theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch - 1991 - MIT Press.
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again.Andy Clark - 1997 - MIT Press.
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action.David Morris, E. Thelen & L. B. Smith - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2).
The Computational Brain.Patricia S. Churchland, Terrence J. Sejnowksi & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (1):137.
Citations of this work BETA
Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Varieties of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science: Explanatory Power, Understanding, and the ‘Mere Description’ Worry.Raoul Gervais - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):43-66.
Similar books and articles
Cognition and the Power of Continuous Dynamical Systems.W. Schonbein - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):57-71.
Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science.William P. Bechtel - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Commentary: Why I Am Not a Dynamicist.Matthew Botvinick - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):78-83.
The Third Contender: A Critical Examination of the Dynamicist Theory of Cognition.Chris Eliasmith - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):441-63.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #102,355 of 2,168,638 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,816 of 2,168,638 )
How can I increase my downloads?