Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental


Authors
Robert Van Gulick
Syracuse University
Abstract
Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
Keywords Description  Intentional  Metaphysics  Rationality  Davidson, D
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Reprint years 1981
ISBN(s) 0164-0771
DOI 10.5840/pra1981718
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