Reasons, concerns, and necessity

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):75-87 (2005)
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This articles concerns the compatibility of orthonomy (making the right choices) and autonomy (making one’s own choices). On the one hand we have the experience that we do not just want to govern ourselves, but that we want to do so rightly. the other hand, it seems that the very fact that our choices are responsive to reasons is insufficient to explain why making these choices adds up to leading a life of one’s own. Iit is argued that we can develop a viable view on the co-realisation of autonomy and orthonomy by using the concept of a concern which is closely linked to the concept op caring.

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Ewing's Problem.Christian Piller - 2007 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.

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References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 2004--28.
Enticing Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press. pp. 91-118.
Two problems about human agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.

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