Religious Credence is not Factual Belief

Cognition 133 (3):698-715 (2014)
Abstract
I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs are practical setting independent, cognitively govern other attitudes, and are evidentially vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences have perceived normative orientation, are susceptible to free elaboration, and are vulnerable to special authority. This theory provides a framework for future research in the epistemology and psychology of religious credence
Keywords Belief  Credence  Religion  Cognitive Attitude  Imagination  Pretense  Cognitive Science of Religion  Cognitive Governance  Practical Setting  Attitude Type
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DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015
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References found in this work BETA
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Divine Intuition: Cognitive Style Influences Belief in God.Amitai Shenhav, David G. Rand & Joshua D. Greene - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 141 (3):423.

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Citations of this work BETA
You Meta Believe It.Neil Levy - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.
Religious Fictionalism and the Problem of Evil.Jon Robson - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (3):353-360.

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