Reflective moral equilibrium and psychological theory

Ethics 109 (4):846-857 (1999)
Tamara Horowitz criticizes the use of thought experiments by Warren Quinn and others to support a version of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. She argues that because a competing empirical explanatory hypothesis for our common agreement on the correct outcome in those thought experiments is true we should conclude that our intuitions concerning those examples do not provide support for the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Other authors have reached similar conclusions. I argue that the argument misconstrues the role of higher order reflection on first order intuitive moral judgements in moral thinking. Appropriately appreciating that role will require us to reject Horowitz's claim that she has undermined arguments from Quinn's examples to the conclusion that there is a morally significance difference between doing and allowing.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/233950
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,440
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Cognitive Scientific Challenges to Morality.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.
Making Psychology Normatively Significant.Regina A. Rini - 2013 - Journal of Ethics 17 (3):257-274.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
59 ( #90,577 of 2,180,199 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #303,871 of 2,180,199 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums