David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 53 (1):3-24 (2005)
In this paper I argue that the intuitions which made Davidson and Hare use the word "supervenience," were not the same as those which underlie current supervenience discussions. There are crucial differences between, on the one hand, the concerns of Davidson and Hare, as I interpret them, and "received" theories of supervenience on the other. I suggest the use of the term by Davidson and Hare lends support to turning the concept upside down by giving priority to the Manifest Image rather than the Scientific Image (which underlies the received physicalistic paradigm of supervenience)
|Keywords||Mental Metaphysics Monism Supervenience Davidson, D Hare, R|
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Brakel (1996). Interdiscourse or Supervenience Relations: The Primacy of the Manifest Image. Synthese 106 (2):253 - 297.
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