Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527 (2004)
In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
|Keywords||Linguistics Philosophy of Language Artificial Intelligence Computational Linguistics Semantics Syntax|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Evolution of Horn's Rule.Kris de Jaegher - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):275-284.
Games and Quantity Implicatures.Robert van Rooij - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):261-274.
Holism, Communication, and the Emergence of Public Meaning: Lessons From an Economic Analogy.Andrew Kenneth Jorgensen - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):133-147.
Measure Phrase Equatives and Modified Numerals.Jessica Rett - 2015 - Journal of Semantics 32 (3):425-475.
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