Signalling games select horn strategies

Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (4):493-527 (2004)
In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.
Keywords Linguistics   Philosophy of Language   Artificial Intelligence   Computational Linguistics   Semantics   Syntax
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3f
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Learning with Neighbours.Roland Mühlenbernd - 2011 - Synthese 183 (S1):87-109.
The Evolution of Horn's Rule.Kris de Jaegher - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):275-284.
Games and Quantity Implicatures.Robert van Rooij - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):261-274.
Measure Phrase Equatives and Modified Numerals.Jessica Rett - 2015 - Journal of Semantics 32 (3):425-475.

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