Topoi 21 (1-2):209-215 (2002)
Robust moral rationalism has long been regarded as incompatible with the Humean Theory of Motivation which requires desires to ground motives. Recently this orthodoxy has been challenged on the ground that rationality itself might require certain desires. This strategy does not remove the tension between rationalism and the Humean Theory. If rationalism is correct, new normative beliefs should engender new motives - motives not grounded in a means-ends fashion in rationally required existing desires. Thus the motivational responses we should expect would be ruled out by the Humean Theory, even when supplemented by rationally required desires. Anti-Humeans about rationality should not be Humeans about motivation.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Technology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
XIV—What Are Sources of Motivation?Giles Pearson - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3_pt_3):255-276.
Similar books and articles
Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.
Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality.van Roojen Mark - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.
The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit.Michael Smith - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):589-595.
Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):1-24.
Motivation-Encompassing Attitudes.Christopher G. Framarin - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):121 – 130.
The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads106 ( #47,328 of 2,172,842 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #172,512 of 2,172,842 )
How can I increase my downloads?