Utilitas 15 (3):353-368 (2003)

Authors
Abstract
I oppose the way John Skorupski characterizes morality in terms of the blameworthy and the role he consequently assigns to punitive feelings in directing one's will and shaping one's character. Skorupski does not hold that the punishment involved in blame- and guilt-feelings grounds the normativity of moral obligation. He defends a specific view of moral psychology and moral practice in which the blame-feeling disposes to the withdrawal of recognition, which involves some sort of casting the transgressor out of the community resulting in the suffering of repentance which is necessary to make atonement possible. I argue that this picture threatens to socialize morality. I defend the Kantian idea that the will is not aligned to obligation through castigation, but through our consciousness of our vocation as takers and givers of reasons. This highlights very different feelings as essential to the typically moral stance, feelings that are not necessarily punitive, like feelings of respect and reverence.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820800004106
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,447
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
Emotions and Reasons.Patricia S. Greenspan - 1992 - Noûs 26 (2):250-252.
On the Emotions.Richard Wollheim - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):442-444.
The Rationality of Emotion.William Lyons - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):631-633.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Protecting Autonomy as Authenticity Using Ulysses Contracts.Theo Van Willigenburg & Patrick Delaere - 2005 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (4):395 – 409.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.Ido Geiger - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
The Role of Feelings in Kant's Account of Moral Education.Alix Cohen - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4):511-523.
Moral Excuses and Blame-Based Theories of Moral Wrongness.Benjamin Rossi - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):153-165.
Feeling and Value.Cheryl Hause Calhoun - 1981 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller.Reed Winegar - 2013 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95 (3):275-297.
Moral Obligation, Blame, and Self-Governance.John Skorupski - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):158-180.
The Role of Moral Feeling in Kantian Ethics.Margaret Dell Jewett - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
The Apriority of Moral Feeling.Susan M. Purviance - 1999 - Idealistic Studies 29 (1/2):75-87.
Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved.Qingjie Wang - 2010 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (3):309-321.
Guilt and Child Soldiers.Krista Thomason - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):115-127.
Morality Reason and Feeling.Charles Bailey - 1980 - Journal of Moral Education 9 (2):114-121.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-30

Total views
60 ( #154,521 of 2,330,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #585,854 of 2,330,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes