The combination of logic and game theory provides a ﬁne-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this ﬁne-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.
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Substantive Assumptions in Interaction: A Logical Perspective.Olivier Roy & Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):891-908.
On the Use of Logic in Game Theory.Eric Pacuit - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):741-753.
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