Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28 (1998)

Abstract
According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.
Keywords cognition   computability   computational systems   computers   dynamical systems   modeling   systems   time
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x98001733
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Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.

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Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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