The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action

Philosophy Compass 9 (11):791-802 (2014)
Authors
Neil Van Leeuwen
Georgia State University
Abstract
In this Part II, I investigate different approaches to the question of what makes imagining different from belief. I find that the sentiment-based approach of David Hume falls short, as does the teleological approach, once advocated by David Velleman. I then consider whether the inferential properties of beliefs and imaginings may differ. Beliefs, I claim, exhibit an anti-symmetric inferential governance over imaginings: they are the background that makes inference from one imagining to the other possible; the reverse is not true, and this allows us to distinguish the two attitudes. I then go on to consider the action theory of imagining and the role that imaginings play in generating emotion
Keywords imagination  pretending  propositional attitudes  belief  i-desire  action  emotion  imagining  pretense  Hume
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12141
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.

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Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - forthcoming - Mind and Language.

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