The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):864-875 (2004)
Authors
Maarten Van Dyck
University of Ghent
Abstract
Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
Keywords Galileo  Experiments  Conceptual innovation
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1086/508115
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