Analysis 64 (2):95–105 (2004)

Johan Van Benthem
University of Amsterdam
The general verificationist thesis says that What is true can be known or formally: φ → ◊Kφ VT Fitch's argument trivializes this principle. It uses a weak modal epistemic logic to show that VT collapses truth and knowledge, by taking a clever substitution instance for φ: P ∧ ¬KP → ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) Then we have the following chain of three conditionals (a) ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) → ◊ (KP ∧ K¬KP) in the minimal modal logic for the knowledge operator K, (b) ◊ (KP ∧ K¬KP) → ◊ (KP ∧¬KP) in the modal logic T, and finally (c) ◊ (KP ∧¬KP) → ⊥ in the minimal modal logic for
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00467.x
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Commonplace Book, 1919-1953.George Edward Moore (ed.) - 1962 - New York: Routledge.
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Diamonds Are a Philosopher's Best Friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
Victor Vanquished.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):135–142.

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Moore’s Paradox, Introspection and Doxastic Logic.Adam Rieger - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):215-227.

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