What one may come to know

Analysis 64 (2):95–105 (2004)

Abstract

The general verificationist thesis says that What is true can be known or formally: φ → ◊Kφ VT Fitch's argument trivializes this principle. It uses a weak modal epistemic logic to show that VT collapses truth and knowledge, by taking a clever substitution instance for φ: P ∧ ¬KP → ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) Then we have the following chain of three conditionals (a) ◊ K(P ∧ ¬KP) → ◊ (KP ∧ K¬KP) in the minimal modal logic for the knowledge operator K, (b) ◊ (KP ∧ K¬KP) → ◊ (KP ∧¬KP) in the modal logic T, and finally (c) ◊ (KP ∧¬KP) → ⊥ in the minimal modal logic for

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Author's Profile

Johan Van Benthem
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2001 - Studia Logica 76 (1):142-148.
Commonplace Book, 1919-1953.George Edward Moore (ed.) - 1962 - New York: Routledge.
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Diamonds Are a Philosopher's Best Friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.

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