Yet more modal logics of preference change and belief revision


Authors
Jan Van Eijck
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15] with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness of a very expressive logic of belief revision, and define a mechanism for updating belief revision models using a combination of action priority update [7] and preference substitution [8].
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AGM Belief Revision in Monotone Modal Logics.Gregory Wheeler - 2010 - LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings.

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