Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

Part I: Building blocks. 1. Folk convictions -- 2. Doubts about libertarianism -- 3. Nihilism and revisionism -- 4. Building a better theory -- Part II. A theory of moral responsibility. 5. The primacy of reasons -- 6. Justifying the practice -- 7. Responsible agency -- 8. Blame and desert -- 9. History and manipulation --10. Some conclusions.

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Chapters

Folk Convictions

The chapter argues for three ideas: (1) we have diverse intuitions, and some of those intuitions are plausibly understood as compatibilist, and others as incompatibilist, and (2) this result suggests that no theory will accommodate all intuitions, but (3) the problem of intuitional fit is ... see more

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Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego