Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

Part I: Building blocks. 1. Folk convictions -- 2. Doubts about libertarianism -- 3. Nihilism and revisionism -- 4. Building a better theory -- Part II. A theory of moral responsibility. 5. The primacy of reasons -- 6. Justifying the practice -- 7. Responsible agency -- 8. Blame and desert -- 9. History and manipulation --10. Some conclusions.

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BJ1451.V37 2013

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9780199697540   019969754X   9780198709367   0198709366   9780191748851
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Chapters

Folk Convictions

The chapter argues for three ideas: (1) we have diverse intuitions, and some of those intuitions are plausibly understood as compatibilist, and others as incompatibilist, and (2) this result suggests that no theory will accommodate all intuitions, but (3) the problem of intuitional fit is ... see more

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Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Responsibility for implicit bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.

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