Philosophia 34 (4):395-404 (2006)

Achille C. Varzi
Columbia University
Giuliano Torrengo
Università degli Studi di Milano
Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?
Keywords ontology  action  event  prohibition  punishment  agency  activity  accomplishment  achievement  state
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9040-x
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.A. Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Dale Jacquette - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):540-542.

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