Crimes and punishments

Philosophia 34 (4):395-404 (2006)
Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?
Keywords ontology  action  event  prohibition  punishment  agency  activity  accomplishment  achievement  state
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9040-x
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PhilPapers Archive Giuliano Torrengo, Crimes and punishments
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