Mind 112 (446):295–298 (2003)
R. Sorensen’s argument to the effect that ’vague’ is a vague predicate has been used by D. Hyde to infer that vague predicates suffer from higher-order vagueness. M. Tye has objected (convincingly) that this is too strong: all that follows from Sorensen’s result is that there are some border border cases, but not necessarily border border cases of every vague predicate. I argue that this is still too strong: Sorensen’s proof presupposes the existence of border border cases, hence cannot be used to establish that fact on pain of circularity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Higher-Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion.Susanne Bobzien - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.
Extending Gurwitsch’s Field Theory of Consciousness.Jeff Yoshimi & David W. Vinson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 34:104-123.
Similar books and articles
Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example.R. Sorensen - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):393-408.
Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness.Diana Raffman - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #87,053 of 2,178,178 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #54,693 of 2,178,178 )
How can I increase my downloads?