Bioethics 21 (2):75–83 (2007)

Abstract
It is often accepted that we may legitimately speak about voluntary euthanasia only in cases of persons who are suffering because they are incurably injured or have an incurable disease. This article argues that when we consider the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia, we have no good reason to concentrate only on persons who are ill or injured and suffering.
Keywords suffering  autonomy  the definition of voluntary euthanasia  illness  death
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00527.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Myth of Mental Illness.Thomas S. Szasz - 2004 - In Arthur Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti (eds.), Ethics. Georgetown University Press. pp. 43--50.
Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'.Derek Bolton - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.
Is Suffering the Enemy?Richard B. Gunderman - 2002 - Hastings Center Report 32 (2):40-44.
On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument From Mercy.Sarah Bachelard - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):131–140.

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Medical Expertise, Existential Suffering and Ending Life.Jukka Varelius - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2):104-107.

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