Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations: Why justice is impossible in the state of nature

Kantian Review 13 (2):1-45 (2008)

Authors
Helga Varden
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
This paper presents and defends Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obligations. I argue that civil society is not primarily a prudential requirement for justice; it is not merely a necessary evil or moral response to combat our corrupting nature or our tendency to act viciously, thoughtlessly or in a biased manner. Rather, civil society is constitutive of rightful relations because only in civil society can we interact in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Civil society is the means through which we can rightfully interact even on the ideal assumption that no one ever succumbs to immoral temptation.
Keywords Kant  Doctrine of Right  Private Right  Political Obligations
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415400001217
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Two Treatises of Government.John Locke - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant and Women.Helga Varden - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):653-694.
Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment.Zachary Hoskins - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):53-71.
Kant’s Political Philosophy.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):896-909.
The Provisionality of Property Rights in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.Rafeeq Hasan - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):850-876.

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