Los tres grados de compromiso modal de Quine y el no-cognitivismo modal

Signos Filosóficos 12 (23):103-133 (2010)

Resumen: En este artí­culo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional y no-proposicional a través de su teorí­a de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo hacen insatisfactorio; en especí­fico, no puede ofrecer una base adecuada para una explicación no-eliminativista de la necesidad proposicional, dado el papel bastante marginal que le asigna a esta noción en nuestras vidas práctica y teórica, y no puede proporcionar una explicación de la necesidad a posteriori. En vista de esto, intento motivar una teorí­a no-cognitivista modal como, potencialmente, la mejor respuesta al tratamiento escéptico quineano, esto por dos razones: porque respeta importantes consideraciones y criterios quineanos, pero es capaz de remediar las limitaciones que aquejan a la explicación quineana de la necesidad.: In this paper I examine Quine"™s sceptical treatment of propositional and non-propositional necessity through his theory of three grades of modal involvement. I argue that, although it has various valuable features, it suffers from some serious limitations that make it unsatisfactory; specifically, it cannot offer a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of propositional necessity, given the very marginal role he assigns to this notion in our theoretical and practical lives, and it cannot provide an explanation of a posteriori necessity. In view of this I try to motivate a modal non-cognitivist account as, potentially, the best response to Quine"™s sceptical treatment, this for two reasons: because it respects important Quinean concerns and desiderata and it can remediate the limitations that affect Quine"™s account of necessity
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