Naming the stages

Dialectica 57 (4):387–412 (2003)
Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it is that different speakers ever manage to pick out one and the same entity when a host of suitable, overlapping candidates are available. But what if the entity in question is neither a continuant nor a perdurant? What if the things we talk about in ordinary language are time-bound entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time, or stage sequences whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--like the “waves” at the stadium or the characters of a cartoon? In such cases the rigidity claim can’t be right and a counterpart-theoretic semantics seems required. Is that bad? I say it isn’t. And it had better not be, if that turns out to be the best metaphysical option we have.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00279.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,488
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jiri Benovsky (2015). Dual‐Aspect Monism. Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):335-352.
Yuri Balashov (2007). About Stage Universalism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):21–39.
Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

43 ( #112,881 of 1,925,792 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #107,186 of 1,925,792 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.