Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will

Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):239-254 (2006)

Authors
Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of compatibilism, and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will.
Keywords Experimental Philosophy  Free Will  Shaun Nichols  Moral Responsibility  Folk beliefs
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/156853706776931240
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,206
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
Variantism About Responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
193 ( #40,689 of 2,285,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #251,846 of 2,285,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature