Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman

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New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Michael Bratman's work has been unusually influential, with significance in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, computer science, law, and primatology.The essays in this volume engage with ideas and themes prominent in Bratman's work. The volume also includes a lengthy reply by Bratman that breaks new ground and deepens our understanding of the nature of action

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B945.B744354.R38 2014

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9780199794515   0199794510

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Chapters

Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton
The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy.Alfred Mele
Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism.  (pages 56-82)Kieran Setiya
Desires... and Beliefs... of One's Own.  (pages 129-151)Geoffrey Sayre-McCord & Michael A. Smith
The Nature of Agreements: A Solution to Some Puzzles about Claim-Rights and Joint Intention.  (pages 215-255)Margaret Gilbert

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Author Profiles

Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego
Gideon Yaffe
Yale University

Citations of this work

Responsibility for structural injustice: A third thought.Robert E. Goodin & Christian Barry - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):339-356.

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