Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments

In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford Up (forthcoming)

Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego
Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency.
Keywords Situationism  Free Will  Moral Responsibility  Revisionism  Dispositionalism  Conditional Analysis
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Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Vigilance and Control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
Building a Better Theory of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2635-2649.

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