David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford Up (forthcoming)
Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the ﬁrst half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency.
|Keywords||Situationism Free Will Moral Responsibility Revisionism Dispositionalism Conditional Analysis|
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Victoria McGeer (2015). Building a Better Theory of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2635-2649.
Tillmann Vierkant & Rosa Hardt (2015). Explicit Reasons, Implicit Stereotypes and the Effortful Control of the Mind. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):251-265.
Vishnu Sridharan (2014). Rational Action and Moral Ownership. Neuroethics 7 (2):195-203.
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