Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments

In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. New York: Oxford UP (2013)
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Abstract

Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency.

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Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Vigilance and Control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Building a Better Theory of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2635-2649.

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